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THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURN-
ING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK. By Bernard Schwartz.! 
Boston: Northeastern University Press. 1990. Pp. x, 310. 
$32.50. 
David P. Bryden 2 
Professor Bernard Schwartz is best known as a prolific histo-
rian of the deliberations of the modern Supreme Court. In this 
book, he turns from history to jurisprudence, sounding an alarm 
against the ideas of conservative legal scholars and judges. His 
chief targets are Robert Bork, Lino Graglia, Richard Epstein, Rich-
ard Posner and Antonin Scalia. Their ideas, he asserts, "have come 
to dominate the legal landscape." Yet they "would turn back the 
constitutional clock by a century," with the result that "Jim Crow, 
child labor, the third degree, and destructive individualism may 
once again characterize American society." 
Professor Schwartz does not pretend to be an original jurispru-
dential thinker, and it would be easy to dismiss this book as patently 
hyperbolic. Certainly it will be news to Judge Bork and Professors 
Epstein and Graglia, if not to the other villains in Schwartz's 
drama, that their ideas are now "dominant." It will also be news, to 
anyone who hasn't been living on Mars, that Jim Crow and child 
labor may soon reappear. 
Nevertheless, I found the book most interesting, chiefly be-
cause Schwartz attacks two different types of conservatives: "origi-
nal intention" restraintists like Bork, plus "law and economics" 
activists like Epstein. This is not necessarily a self-contradictory 
project, but it is one that requires a degree of dialectical flair. The 
task, of course, is to show that Bork and company are wholly wrong 
without showing that Epstein and company may be at least partly 
right. If the Constitution is as flexible as liberal jurisprudents usu-
ally contend, then why not flex it in the direction of substantive 
economic due process? Throughout the world, market solutions are 
proving superior to socialism. Should constitutional law reflect that 
modern reality? I read the book in order to gain enlightenment on 
this topic. 
Whatever else one may say about Professor Schwartz, there's 
no denying that he is a mainstream constitutional scholar. As such, 
he is in some ways more interesting than a highly original jurispru-
I. Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I want to thank my colleague John 
Cound for reading this review and making several hepful suggestions. 
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dent. The original thinker may be more impressive, but is unlikely 
to reveal quite as much about the dilemmas and contradictions of 
ordinary constitutional thought. 
I 
Concerning the intentions of the framers, Schwartz makes 
most of the usual points: their intentions are often hard to discern; 
Madison may have thought one thing, another delegate something 
else, and a state ratifying convention something different still; the 
framers wisely left much of the text vague; and in any event a "liv-
ing Constitution" is superior to "machinelike exegesis of a funda-
mental text." Adherence to the framers' intentions, Schwartz adds, 
would lead to some horrendous results: for example, paper money 
would be unconstitutional, and barbaric punishments for crime 
would be upheld. Substantive due process would disappear, which 
would "remove the great safeguard that our courts have develped 
against arbitrary governmental action." Bolling v. Sharpe would be 
overruled, and so the federal government would be allowed to im-
pose racial segregation. Indeed, "Since the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's framers did not intend it to prohibit school segregation, 
reliance on original intention as the determinative factor could have 
meant a different decision in the Brown case." Likewise, an 
originalist approach to the establishment clause could lead to re-
sults that, however appropriate in an eighteenth-century context, 
would be "irrelevant to the needs of our society two centuries 
later." 
Even on their own terms, says Schwartz, the conservatives are 
often wrong about the Constitution. They condemn Griswold, for 
instance, as a revival of natural law, yet "natural law itself has been 
an essential element of American constitutionalism." Furthermore, 
"Both the history and the language of the Ninth Amendment indi-
cate that there are individual rights requiring protection even 
though they are not enumerated in the Constitution or Bill of 
Rights." "Above all," the framers "would have emphasized the 
right of property as one that depended more on the nature of man 
than specific constitutional guaranty." By the same token, although 
no constitutional provision specifically protects marital rights, "few 
will disagree that there are such rights and that they are beyond the 
reach of government." 
Schwartz believes that it is a mistake to assume "that the con-
ception of non textual rights must rest wholly on the unfettered dis-
cretion of the judge . . . . " When the Court creates or expands a 
nontextual right, it is only doing what common law courts have 
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done for centuries. In determing which rights are fundamental, 
judges "are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal 
and private notions." Instead, they look to "the traditions and col-
lective conscience of our people." "By training and tradition, the 
Justices are well-equipped for this task; they can be expected both 
to be keenly perceptive to violations of personal rights and to be 
sufficiently detached to avoid imposing their purely personal no-
tions, not shared by others, upon society." After all, "Our judges 
are products of our society, and ... they will generally think along 
with the beliefs of some substantial segment of the citizenry." 
Therefore, Bork's concern about judicial creativity is misplaced. 
It would be impossible, in the narrow compass of a book re-
view, to respond fully to each of these arguments. In any event, I 
have no fundamental quarrel with many elements of the standard 
liberal brief against originalism. I do object to some arguments-
for instance, the strained effort to derive Griswold and Roe from the 
ninth amendment,3 and the analogy between the role of ordinary 
judges in making common law, or interpreting statutes, and the role 
of the Supreme Court in fashioning rules that not even Congress 
can repeal. But I have at least as many reservations about standard 
conservative "originalist" analyses as I do about the liberals' 
arguments. 
Like most authors, conservative as well as liberal, Schwartz 
equates judicial restraint with originalism. Since the case for judi-
cial restraint is commonly couched in legalistic terms, this is an un-
derstandable response: A legalistic brief for restraint begets a 
legalistic refutation. But as Robert Nagel4 and otherss have sug-
gested, the case for judicial restraint need not be overly legalistic. 
Even if we wholly ignore the constitutional text and the intentions 
of the framers, we must still decide whether, for example, we want 
every state to be free to devise its own prophylaxis against coerced 
confessions, or whether we prefer to have a national rule fashioned 
by the Supreme Court. Since no one professes to favor turning all 
governmental decisions over to the Court, even the freest of free 
interpreters needs a theory of judicial restraint, or at least criteria 
for selecting the Court's agenda. Quite apart from whether the 
3. For a good analysis, see Alexander, Book Review, 1 CoNST. CoMM. 396 (1990). 
However much the framers may have wished to retain old unenumerated rights, I see no 
reason to conclude that they wanted to delegate to the Court the quite different task of creat-
ing new ones. 
4. R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CoNSEQUENCES 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989). 
5. E.g., Bryden, Politics, the Constitution. and the New Formalism, 3 CONST. CoMM. 
415 (1986). 
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Constitution requires it, there is much to be said for the federalist 
values of pluralism, diversity, and local responsibility, even though 
the price of advancing these values is often high, and sometimes too 
high. If freedom means anything, it means freedom to err. So in-
stead of beating the dead horse of originalism, let's ask how much 
freedom and diversity we want. It's a tough question, which is all 
the more reason to discuss it. 
The liberal brief against originalism is, I believe, basically 
sound, but I object to its injudicious, debaterish quality. (Here 
again, the same criticism could be made of most conservative juris-
prudents.) Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon, in 
Schwartz's book, is his argument that the Justices, though not truly 
bound by law, are adequately constrained by the fact that they 
wouldn't be on the Court if they were idiosyncratic thinkers, and by 
their obligation to justify new rights by reference to "the traditions 
and collective conscience of our people." Therefore, reasons 
Schwartz, the Court's innovations are not simply subjective political 
preferences. Surely Professor Schwartz would scornfully reject 
these arguments if they were offered by a conservative as justifica-
tions for, say, Lochner, or for a decision holding that all affirmative 
action is unconstitutional. It's not much solace to a conservative 
who is appalled by a Blackmon opinion, or a liberal who can't stand 
Rehnquist, to know that their life-tenured tormentor isn't "idiosyn-
cratic." Isn't it obvious that in any constitutional dispute worth 
discussing, from pornography to the tenth amendment, both sides 
can draw from deep reservoirs of tradition and popular feeling? 
Even in Griswold, where the law was far more arbitrary and unpop-
ular than most, Connecticut was on the side of some powerful 
American traditions-if nothing else, democracy. 
My most basic reservation about the brief against originalism is 
that it's an unreal issue, like debating whether the United States 
should adopt pacifism as our national policy. The notion that there 
is a constant battle between originalist and nonoriginalist Justices, 
though widely accepted by both sides in the Great Debate, rests on 
a confusion between two radically different senses of the word. 
There are indeed many "originalist" decisions in the sense of deci-
sions that one supposes the framers would have approved as inter-
pretations of the Constitution. In this weak sense, every Justice is 
an originalist from time to time. For example, most of the framers 
probably would have thought it absurd to say that the first amend-
ment protects nude dancing. A Justice who declines to protect 
nude dancing shares the original attitude, and should be applauded 
(or condemned) on policy grounds for doing so. But this does not 
340 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:336 
necessarily mean that he is an originalist in the strong sense of being 
prepared to follow wherever the framers lead: he may merely disap-
prove of nude dancing. After all, Justice Brennan sometimes cited 
the framers' intentions when it suited his purposes, yet he dis-
avowed originalism. As a theory of legal obligation, "originalism" 
must mean let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may originalism. In this 
strong sense, how many originalist decisions have been handed 
down? In other words, how often have the Justices interpreted an 
ambiguous constitutional phrase in a way that appears to depart 
from their own political preferences, because of a sense of obligation 
to follow the framers' intentions (whether narrowly or broadly de-
fined)? Obviously, we cannot say for certain, but after reading 
Supreme Court decisions for many years I have found none that 
seem to have been reached by consulting the ideas of the framers, 
where those ideas plainly contradicted the Justices' own political 
tendencies. 
Brown v. Board of Education, for example, may or may not be 
consistent with the framers' beliefs about equality, expressed at 
some appropriate level of generality. But it surely was not an 
originalist decision in the strong sense that I have described. If the 
Justices had paid no attention to the fourteenth amendment, they 
would, no doubt, have reached exactly the same result. 
I see evidence that the clear language of the text of the Consti-
tution has sometimes affected results, for instance in fixing the 
length of the president's term of office, but I know of hardly any 
evidence that, where the text is thought to be ambiguous, Justices' 
votes are determined by the results of research into the framers' 
intentions. Perhaps some individual votes can be found, but I doubt 
that the Court as a whole has ever decided a controversial case in 
this manner, reaching a result that the Justices would not have 
reached if they had been a Council of Revision. Originalism is a 
wonderful academic plaything, the most delightful toy in the sand-
box of constitutional jurisprudence, but it's not the way the world 
works, or can be made to work. The pretense to the contrary is the 
main defect of conservative constitutional thought. 
II 
Like most liberal constitutional thinkers, Professor Schwartz 
regards himself as an anti-formalist, opposing the "mechanistic" 
theories of conservative strict constructionists. But once he turns 
from Bork on original intention to Graglia on school busing, 
Schwartz himself becomes what might be called a liberal legal for-
malist. Notwithstanding his strictures about the "living Constitu-
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tion," Schwartz manages to discuss school busing for racial 
integration without assessing-or even acknowledging the impor-
tance of assessing-the effects of busing on education, race rela-
tions, poverty, and the decay of our cities. Professor Graglia has 
depicted court-ordered busing as "disaster by decree"; this ap-
praisal, though it may be mistaken, is not implausible.6 Given the 
anti-legalistic stance of his chapter on Bork, one would expect 
Schwartz to respond to Graglia by weighing the evidence on school 
busing's effects, in order to arrive at a good public policy for the 
courts to enforce. Instead, he treats cross-district busing for 
integration as an irresistible deduction from Brown v. Board of 
Education. 
Busing, he says, has been a "remedial" measure. The meaning 
of this characterization is unclear. At times, Schwartz seems to be 
talking about the need to deal with segregationist stratagems in the 
aftermath of Brown. But at times he seems to mean that the inte-
grationist purpose of Brown will be defeated if neighborhood 
schools are maintained, inasmuch as urban neighborhoods tend to 
be divided along racial lines. Neither of these arguments is wholly 
unfounded, but they are far from being a judicious reading of 
Brown's ambiguities or a pragmatic appraisal of whether busing for 
integration is good social policy, in a city like Seattle, in 1991. If 
indeed we have a "living Constitution," it will not do to invoke 
Brown v. Board, mechanically, as a solution to problems arising 
nearly forty years afterwards. 
Liberal legal formalism also provides a mechanical answer to 
Epstein, Siegan, and Posner. Their theories, explains Professor 
Schwartz, run counter to several decades of "settled law" and 
would "resurrect Lochner." Q.E.D. 
Concerning Lochner, Schwartz sounds like Thayer, Holmes, or 
Frankfurter. "In holding the Lochner law invalid," he explains, 
"the Court in effect substituted its judgment for that of the legisla-
tor, and decided for itself that the statute was not reasonably related 
to any of the social ends for which the police power might validly be 
exercised." Schwartz prefers the approach taken by Justice Harlan 
in dissent: where the reasonableness of a regulation is debatable, it 
should be upheld. 
The next question, obviously, is why this sort of judical re-
straint, long since abandoned by most liberals in civil liberties cases, 
still makes sense in economic regulation (and affirmative action) 
cases. "The Siegan posture," Schwartz reminds us, "is, of course, 
6. See, e.g., Feldman, Book Review, 3 CONST. COMM. 644 (1986). 
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contrary to the now settled jurisprudence on the subject." Schwartz 
does concede, however, that this "settled jurisprudence" is a rela-
tively recent development: the framers regarded property rights as 
central, and until the late 1930s the Court did not wholly reject this 
view. 
At bottom, Schwartz's reason for rejecting property rights is 
not legalistic. He argues instead that property rights reflect outmo-
ded laissez-faire, Spencerian notions that grind down the poor. He 
invokes Brandeis as a kind of substitute Founding Father: "Com-
pare the Brandeis brief, with its emphasis throughout on the eco-
nomic and social conditions that called forth the challenged statute, 
with Lochner, where those factors were all but ignored. The differ-
ence is as marked as that between the poetry of T.S. Eliot and Al-
fred Austin." Well, I suggest that Professor Schwartz re-read some 
of those Brandeis briefs. I assure him that if he reads the "expert 
evidence" in the Muller brief to a law school class next year, and 
tells the class that he agrees with Brandeis's experts' opinions about 
women, the students will either laugh at him or lynch him. Bran-
deis was a fascinating thinker and an extremely talented lawyer, but 
his briefs do not deserve the lavish and uncritical adulation that 
progressives have bestowed on them. 1 
To illustrate the difference between Brandeis and his ignorant 
brethren, Schwartz mentions New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. At 
issue was a state law requiring a certificate of convenience and ne-
cessity for entry into the business of manufacturing and selling ice. 
Licenses were to be issued only upon proof of the necessity for a 
supply of ice at the place where the applicant wished to establish the 
business; the application was to be denied if existing licensed facili-
ties "are sufficient to meet the public needs therein." The Supreme 
Court struck down this licensing requirement. Rejecting this deci-
sion, Schwartz cites Brandeis for the proposition that duplication of 
ice plants is wasteful and leads "to destructive and frequently ruin-
ous competition," which is "ultimately burdensome to consumers," 
evidently because it may lead to a monopoly. Having described 
Brandeis's view, Schwartz then sets forth the contrary view of 
Judge Posner, who believes that, "The people actually wronged by 
the statute were the poor, who were compelled to pay more for ice; 
the well-to-do, as Brandeis pointed out, were more likely to have 
refrigerators." 
How does Schwartz decide between Brandeis and Posner? By 
asserting that the Chicago school of economists, on whose theories 
Posner relies, "has never reconciled itself to the fact that, in this 
7. See generally, Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. COMM. 281 (1984). 
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century, the invisible hand of Adam Smith has increasingly been 
replaced by the 'public interest' as defined in regulatory legislation 
and administration." He accuses such economists of trying "to im-
munize the economy from interference by the machinery of the 
law." They want to resurrect "the doctrine of laissez-faire that 
dominated thinking at the turn of the century." In short, Professor 
Schwartz evaluates the Brandeis-Posner dispute about New State 
Ice without even trying to assess the effects of the law on the poor. 
He relies instead on name-calling, invoking scarewords like "Legal 
Darwinism," "laissez-faire" and "individualism" that he knows are 
anathema to his politically correct readers. It's like denouncing the 
income tax as "communistic" at a Rotary Club luncheon in 1900. 
The same evasive quality permeates Schwartz's discussions of 
other cases raising economic issues. He rarely or never discusses 
empirical evidence about the effects of individual laws, relying in-
stead on familiar formulas and catchwords, all the while criticizing 
tum-of-the-century conservatives for doing exactly the same thing. 
III 
Most of us tend to spend our lives repeating the political and 
jurisprudential shibboleths that we learned long ago in school, and 
Professor Schwartz is, to say the least, no exception. This is per-
haps most apparent in his discussion of takings and just compensa-
tion. Here again, Schwartz warns that the New Right are radicals 
who "aim to uproot established doctrine and replace it with princi-
ples long repudiated by a settled line of case law." I'm shocked. 
"To Epstein," he intones, the takings clause "is far broader than its 
literal language." Imagine that! 
One of Epstein's theses is that the courts should revive the re-
quirement that takings be for a "public" rather than a "private" 
use. I have not studied that problem, but it seems to raise three 
basic issues. Are there some takings that should be criticized, even 
if accompanied by compensation, on the ground that they are un-
wise or unjust? I suppose that the answer to that question is yes: if 
the Minnesota Legislature confiscates my property and awards it to 
the Governor's nephew, for no apparent reason except that he 
wants it, probably even Professor Schwartz would be moved to crit-
icize the politicians. The next question is whether the courts should 
have some role in preventing this sort of thing. And the third ques-
tion is whether they should have as large a role as Professor Epstein 
desires. I had an open mind on these last two questions when I 
began to read Schwartz's discussion, and I regret to say that it is 
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equally open today. Here is a typical passage from Schwartz's 
treatment of the subject: 
It should not be forgotten that both the police power and the eminent-domain 
power are only different weapons in the governmental arsenal, all of which are in-
tended to enable government to serve the great public needs that the prevailing 
thought of the day deems essential to the welfare of society. In an era dominated by 
an ever-expanding police power, it would be anomalous if an equally vital govern-
mental power were confined within the narrower range permitted to it when the 
police power itself was more rigidly construed. 
A nice debater's point, perhaps, but not very helpful if one is 
trying to decide whether there are real abuses that need judicial cor-
rection. Perhaps the police power also needs to be supervised more 
aggressively by the courts; if so, any "anomaly" will vanish. Cer-
tainly many state zoning cases, applauded by liberals, have endeav-
ored to second-guess the police power, in order to combat 
"exclusionary zoning." (Of which more in a moment.) In any 
event, I see nothing anomalous in stricter scrutiny of a law that 
expels me from my land (albeit with compensation) than of a law 
that merely reduces the value of the land somewhat (albeit without 
compensation). I know that some specialists think that urban rede-
velopment ("slum clearance") is beneficial, while others have tried 
to prove the contrary. Yet Professor Schwartz has only this to say 
about Berman v. Parker : "Slum clearance bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to the ends that may be attained by the state's police 
power; hence the land involved is being taken for a public use." 
Now that may indeed be the proper conclusion in cases like Berman, 
but what I need are reasons, not musty formulas from the first edi-
tion of Corpus Juris. Specifically, I need to know whether the tak-
ings that Epstein condemns are good public policy and, if not, 
whether there are nevertheless good reasons for the courts to up-
hold them. 
Instead of analyzing the realities of eminent domain, Schwartz 
discusses the original meaning of the just compensation clause, to 
determine "whether it supports Epstein's interpretation"! He 
quotes Bork to the effect that Epstein goes too far, apparently for-
getting that, in his effort to refute Bork in an earlier chapter, he 
gave property rights as the main example of a right that the framers 
considered to be independent of any mere textual provision. After 
reviewing the history of protections against takings without com-
pensation enacted before the fifth amendment was adopted, he con-
cludes that the original intent was limited to physical seizures; it did 
not extend to regulatory "takings." Schwartz then proceeds to ar-
gue that the concept of regulatory takings is inconsistent with the 
"ordinary meaning" of "taking" and, finally, that Epstein's argu-
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ment for enlargement of the concept is "completely contrary to the 
established law on the matter." 
The "established law," as Schwartz correctly notes, generally 
upholds police-power regulations against takings challenges except 
in some cases where the regulation has prevented the landowner 
from making any beneficial use of the property. Even then, regula-
tions prohibiting nuisance-like activities are usually upheld. 
Although the law on regulatory takings has not changed much 
over the decades, the courts in heavily-developed states like Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey have often invalidated large minimum lot 
sizes and some other zoning techniques that increase the cost of 
housing and thereby exclude less affluent purchasers from suburban 
enclaves. Zoning is no longer regarded, by most land use special-
ists, as a "progressive" type of regulation, resisted only by blind 
adherents of laissez-faire. Long ago, authors like Seymour Toll and 
Richard Babcock brilliantly exposed the role that zoning plays in 
segregation by class. So even if Epstein is mistaken about takings, 
there is a growing scholarly consensus in favor of aggressive judicial 
intervention to protect the interests of moderate-income families in 
affordable housing. Most often, the landowner-developer is the 
party best able to vindicate that interest, given the cost of litigation 
and other constraints on "public-interest" plaintiffs. 
What does Schwartz say about all this? 
Epstein's animadversion notwithstanding, the Euclid decision remains a 
landmark in the legal transformation of property that has taken place during this 
century, under which the virtually absolute right of the owner to use his property as 
he chooses has given way to the principle of reasonable use, as defined by the rele-
vant authorities. 
Schwartz fixes his eyes on the parties: the government (which 
in his view always represents the public interest) and the developer, 
who is of course a greedy landowner from Central Casting, assert-
ing an "absolute right" to "use his property as he chooses." In 
Schwartz's world, nonparties have no stake in this contest. In par-
ticular, he seems oblivious to zoning's role in keeping out the un-
washed-the sort of people who live in mobile homes on quarter-
acre lots. "The principal concern in typical zoning and town-plan-
ning regulation," he blandly assures the reader, "is how an area 
looks." "Aesthetics," he informs us, is the chief motive behind 
"zoning restrictions laying down minimum lot size and minimum 
floor space." Schwartz is apparently unaware of the massive litera-
ture published during the past several decades, largely written by 
his fellow liberals, which documents the exclusionary purposes and 
effects of excessively strict "density controls" in suburban zoning. 
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He is equally dogmatic in defending rent control. As with zon-
ing, he accepts the ostensible purpose of the regulation at face value 
and ignores nonparties. Rent control, he believes, functions to 
"eliminate exorbitantly priced housing." Justice Scalia, he notes, 
objected to a rent control regulation, on the ground that if poor 
tenants are to be subsidized then the general public should foot the 
bill, through taxation. In another rent control case described by 
Schwartz, plaintiffs argued that, by giving tenants the right to a per-
petual lease at a below-market rental rate, the ordinance transferred 
to them a possessory interest in the land on which their mobile 
homes were located. Plaintiffs asserted that the rise in prices of mo-
bile homes in parks subject to this Santa Barbara ordinance re-
flected the transfer of a valuable property right to occupy mobile 
home parks at below-market rates. The ninth circuit upheld this 
complaint against a motion to dismiss. 
One might expect a devotee of the living Constitution to ana-
lyze such cases by discussing the impact of rent control on the sup-
ply and cost of housing. But instead Professor Schwartz chastises 
the ninth circuit for treating an "economic regulation" as if it were 
a physical invasion (p. 135), "a notion that is supported neither by 
logic nor precendent." Logic? Precedent? What became of the liv-
ing Constitution? Oblivious to his own strictures about mechanical 
jurisprudence, he observes that "limitation of the landlord's profit 
has never been held a taking, so long as a reasonable return on in-
vestment is allowed." 
Discussing another Scalia opinion, Schwartz says it is so bad 
that it is reminiscent of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, the case in 
which the conservative Court of the 1920's invalidated a minimum 
wage that was limited to women. Having made this analogy, 
Schwartz clinches his argument: the New Right jurisprudence 
"means a return to the public law of the first part of this century, 
with all the abuses that accompanied it-abuses before which gov-
ernment was legally powerless under the prevailing jurisprudence of 
the time." 
Maybe so, but Adkins is not an apt illustration. Even on the 
left, the type of law at issue in Adkins-protective labor legislation 
for women-is no longer regarded as an unmixed blessing: femi-
nists often bemoan such "paternalism." On this, as on so many 
issues, Schwartz is resting on the formulas of the 1930s. More fun-
damentally, Schwartz seems unwilling to consider the possibility 
that even a sex-neutral minimum wage is harmful. The Brandeis-
Frankfurter briefs in Adkins and other minimum wage cases sought 
to make light of unemployment caused by the minimum wage. But 
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more recently even some liberal economists-Paul Samuelson, for 
example-have argued against the minimum wage on the ground 
that its effects are perverse: although ostensibly designed to help 
the poorest workers, it reduces their employment. I'm not saying 
that it's impossible for a rational scholar to defend the minimum 
wage, only that the case against Adkins needs to be argued, not 
presumed. 
Although Schwartz implies otherwise, the conservative Court 
of yesteryear upheld most of the economic regulations that came 
before it, including some questionable ones. Conceding arguendo 
that some of their property rights decisions were erroneous, that 
hardly distinguishes property rights from any other rights. 
I wish I knew whether on the whole substantive economic due 
process did more harm than good, and if so whether this was for 
reasons that are intrinsic to the doctrine, so that if the Court revives 
it the public will once again suffer. One way to avoid the question is 
by some sort of process-oriented theory: if not Bark's legalism, then 
Thayer's or Nagel's more political brief for judicial restraint. Sev-
eral decades ago, Robert G. McCloskey-that most judicious of 
scholars-examined the usual jurisprudential objections to eco-
nomic due process, and found them unconvincing. He concluded, 
however, that-given the Court's responsibilities in other areas-
the Justices simply did not have time for a major, new undertaking. 
I do not find this conclusion wholly persuasive, but it does have the 
virtue of disposing of the issue without trying to wander through 
the unfamiliar swamps of economic analysis. 
Although Lochner is a convenient pedagogical and polemical 
shorthand for the era, there is no reason to assume that its practical 
consequences were either drastic or typical. Even if we could some-
how calculate that Lochner had terrible effects on the lives of 
thousands of workers, other property rights decisions may have 
helped thousands of common folk, for example by fostering price 
competition. Although Schwartz and other constitutional scholars 
often imply that what's good for General Motors is bad for the 
country, no one with even the slightest economic sophistication 
would endorse such a silly presumption. A decision in favor of a 
developer who wants permission to erect relatively cheap housing is 
a decision in favor of moderate-income consumers, not just a vic-
tory for "a rich landowner," or "dog-eat-dog individualism." A de-
cision in favor of a company that wants permission to sell a product 
in an area where the politicians wish to protect other producers 
against competition is, again, a decision in favor of consumers, not 
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just a victory for "a corporation," or "the privileged few," or "blind 
adherence to outmoded Spencerian dogmas." 
Several years ago I asked a friend of mine, an economist but a 
liberal, to write an essay for Constitutional Commentary evaluating 
the Supreme Court decisions involving New Deal legislation be-
tween 1932 and 1937. I told him that we would furnish abstracts of 
the cases, and he would appraise the economic consequences of the 
decisions. He recoiled in horror, saying that the project was much 
too vast for a single economist. He would need, he informed me, a 
team of specialists. I replied with a smile that economists must be 
dumb: "Every professor of constitutional law knows that the Nine 
Old Men hurt the poor." 
The same dumb economist later reviewed Epstein's Takings for 
me. Although he disagreed with Epstein on some points, he con-
cluded that "much of what he says will make sense to economists of 
various political inclinations."s Law professors, by contrast, 
"know" that property rights help the rich and hurt the poor, and 
we know it so well that, unlike my economist friend, we don't even 
feel the need to prove it. Why bother to prove it? Our readers 
know it too. 
• • • 
I once was invited to attend the bat mitzvah of a friend's 
daughter. As part of the celebration, the presiding rabbi led a dis-
cussion of the concept of the chosen people, soliciting interpreta-
tions from the audience. Some of those interpretations were not 
quite as ecumenical as one might have wished, and eventually the 
rabbi decided to tell a cautionary story. The MacPhersons, it 
seems, lived in a neighborhood that contained Jewish as well as gen-
tile families. One day little Johnny MacPherson came running 
home, in tears, to his mother. "Mommy, is it true that Jesus was a 
Jew?" he asked in anguish. Mrs. MacPherson thought for a mo-
ment, then replied: "Yes dear, but don't you worry: God is a 
Presbyterian." 
Constitutional jurisprudence, in the sense of grand theories 
about the role of the Supreme Court, consists by and large of ear-
nest efforts to prove that God is a Presbyterian. That's why consti-
tutional jurisprudence is so unsatisfying-except, of course, to 
Scots. 
8. Foster, Book Review, 4 CONST. COMM. 443, 448 (1987). 
